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RAY A. BAILEY et al.,
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[1] Zoning- Amendment- Compliance With Statutory Requirements.-Gov.
§

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

of
ordinance were transmitted
with
letter
ments had been approved
the
copy of the
notice of public
that such hearing was held, and a list of the persons who
since it will he presumed from the recommendation
in the absence of evidence to the
that the
commission found that the proposNI ordinance was necessary
for the general public welfare and interest.
!d.-Judicial Remedies-AppeaL-In an action to dedare invalid an amendment of county zoning
where
plainaffidavits produced by defendant contradicted those
tiffs averring that the subject of a juvenile hall was not
discussed at a public hearing held by the planning commission,
a question of fact was raised, and the trial court's determination will not he disturbed on appeal.
Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact-Evidence to Support
Orders.--An appellate court will not disturb implied findings
of fact made by the trial court in support of an
any
more than it will interfere with express findings on -which a
final judgment is predicated.
!d.-Presumptions-Evidence to Support Orders.-When evidence is conflicting, it will he presumed that the court found
every fact necessary to support its ordPr that the evidence
would justify.
!d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Character of Evidence.-So
far as the trial court has passed on the
of conflicting
evidence, its implied findings arc conclusive, and this rule is
equally applicable •vhether the evidence is oral or
!d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Where Evidence is Documentary.-vVhen an issue is tried
the rule on

[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp.,
Zoning,
169 ct seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 7, 8] Zoning, §5; [2] Zoning, §7;
[3] Appeal and Error, § 1298; [4] Appeal and Error, ~ 1165;
[fi] Appeal and Error,~ 1287; [6] Appeal and Error,§ 1299; [9]
Counties, §91; [10] Zoning, §2(2).
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eontl'lllion of the
stnit•d therein and all
may be inferred
and where
eonl!i(·t in the fads
the trial
of the contron;rted facts will not be

111 a
to the
conuui::;sion for n report
report be illed with the
if a
i~ considered
in
hy the
<:OJlilliis.sion ratlH'l' than an entirely new subject matter
nurl initinted by the legislative body (Gov. Code,
G:iG")7), the applicable statute does not require a
by the planning commission after
body of the proposed change in the
rec:oumll'!lded ordinance to the planning commission. (Disto the conir;1ry in Joli11ston v. BoaJ'd of
:n Cd.2d GG, 187 P.2d 686.)
Id.-Amendment-Public Hearing.-The words used by a
(•ommission in an approved amendment of a
ordiu::mee that pl'nperty in any residPntial district may
usc:d for "governmental uses of any kind" are broad enough
encompass use of lnnd for a juvenile hall.
19 Counties-Ordinances-Time of Taking Effect.-If the urgency
ordinance was enacted without legisla( see Gov. Code, § 2:3123; Elec. Code, § 16:31),
yoid and of no
but this does not invalidate the
hdanee of the ordinance which would take effect at the
tinw appointed by law.
[10
of Ordinance.-A proposeu county ordiwhieh woulu amend the basic zoning ordinance to permit
property to he used for governmental purposes
i :· "nc·h m<es are dePmed advisable and benefieial to the general
wPlfare is not special legislation favoring one class.

)E~\L from

an order of the Snperior Court of Los
temporary restraining order,
preliminary iHjnndion and discharging an order to
Arnold l'ra('g·rr, ,Judge. Affirmed.
YaeatiJJg a

Tarr, Car-ter & 0 'Neill, \V. Sumner Holbrook,
Fralleis II. 0 '-'\ eill, for App('llants.

\\T. Kennedy, County Counsel, Edwar<l H. Gaylord
S. Davis, Deputy Couuty Counsel, for Respondents.

, ~was zoned 1{-1 for
use.
of'fieials desired to locate a
hall in the l{aneho Los
area, but in order to do so it was neeessary to amend
the basic
ordinanee of the
'l'he controlling proee,lure to be followed in amending such
an ordinance is found in the Government
s<~etions
65500-65805.
Section 65804 provides: ''Except as otherwise provided in
this article, an amendment to a zoning ordinance -which amendment changes any property from one zone to another or
imposes any regulation listed in Section 65800 not theretofore imposed or removes or modifies any such regulation
theretofore imposed shall be initiated and adopted in the
same manner as required for the initiation and adoption of
the original zoning ordinance.''
Seetion 65650 provides: ''Before reeommending a preeise
plan or regulation to the legislative body or any amendment
to it, for adoption, the planning eommission shall hold at
least one publie hearing."
On July 27, 1954, pursuant to seetion 65651, the reg-ional
planning eommission gave 10 days' published notiee that a
publie hearing would be held relative to reeommending to
the board of supervisors eertain amendments to the zoning
ordinanee. At the publie hearing on ,July 27, 1954, the
proposed amendments were diseussed. One of these amendments proposed that property in any residential zone might
be used for any governmental purpose if a permit were first
obtained in aeeordance with established proeedures.
On August 18, 1954, the planning commission transmitted
to the board of supervisors its recommendation of the proposed amendments together with copies thereof, a copy of
the notiee of hearing, and a list of the persons who testified
at the hearing.
Section 65654 provides that the legislative body may adopt
the plan proposed by the commission by ordinance or resolution, but must first hold at least one publiG hearing. Upon
receipt of the proposed amendments the board of supervisors
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met at 9 a.m.
ordinance which would
hall
prove that such use would not
, or
welfarr. This
ordinance was then forwarded to the planning
which was in session a short distance away. ·while
the board was still sitting a communication was received
the
planning commission. This communication
that the commission had considered and approved
ordinance. The proposed ordinance was read
members of the public present and approximately 15
thereafter the board ordered that the public hearing
in the matter of the proposed amendments to the
ordinance to permit governmental use of property in
any zone after a permit was obtained. The board then passed
the amendments which related only to juvenile halls, and later
made application to the rrgional planning commission for a
permit to use the Rancho r~os Amigos land for a
l1all. A hearing date was set and notice of hearing
but prior to the time set for the hearing plaintiffs,
property owners protesting the amendments, instituted this action and the superior court issued an order
the holding of the meeting pending the hearing
order to show cause. At the hearing of the order to
cause, the restraining order was vacated and the preinjunction denied. This appeal followed.
Plaintiffs contend first that section 63653 of the Govr:rnment Code, which requires a "report of findings, summaries of hearings, and recommendations of the planning
'' was not complied with and that such section is
In the instant case, copies of the proposed amendto the ordinance \Yere transmitted by the commission
board with a letter slating that the proposed amendhad been approw<l by the commission. There was
also copy of thr pnblisherl notiee of the pnblic hearing, a
staJ,~ment that sneh hPRring had been held, and a list of the
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persons ~who there testified.
in Cantrell
Boa1·d
[197 P.2d
, >Yhere the
contention that two
) that it shall transmit '"""""
transmit recommendations. That
'' 'After consideration of all the
mony
at the
that the
of the
nwntal to the llealth and
welfare
the recommendation to
be revoked.
''The
language must be held to
that the
commission had found that detriment and
and general welfare of the community ensued from the operation of the hog ranch in question. And in conneetion with
the action of such eommission and board,
usually
of laymen, the fact that a certain aetion is taken or recommendation made raises the presumption that the existence of
the necessary facts had been ascertained anu found. (Bm·tholomae Oil Corp. v. Seager, 35 Cal.App.2d 77, 80
P.2d
614] ; Lindell Co. v. Boarcl of Pm·mit
23 Cal.2d 303,
323 [144 P.2d 4]; North Side etc. Assn. v. Cmtnfy
Los
Angeles, 70 Cal.App.2d 598, 608, 609 [161 P.2d 613] .) We
cannot perceive ~wherein appellant has been prejudiced by
the absence of formal findings under the facts here
''
The only finding \Yhieh could here have been made was that
the proposed ordinance was necessary for tlw
public
welfare and interest. Since there is nothing to the eontrary
in the record before us, this findi11g may be
from
the recommendation made (Swm·s v. Council of
of
ValleJo, 88 Cal.2d 867, 872 [206 P.2d 353] ).
Plaintiffs next contend that the ordinanee relating
only to juvmile halls enacted by the legislatiYe bod~, ~was a
new and different ordinanee than the anwndments recommended by the planning commission and that it therefore
should have been subject, under the
of section
65657,'~ to a public hearing held by the planning commission.
Defenrlants, on the other hand, contend that the following
*''The legislative body shall first ref or such proposal to establish such
precise plan or regulation to the planning commission for
report.
Before making a report the planning commission shall hold at least
one public hearing in the same manner as heretofore prescribed in this
artiele." (Gov. Code, § 65657.)
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[46 C.2d 132; 293 P.2d 4491

make
or amendcommission until
the planning comlms been filed
§ 65655.) Defendhall comes ·within the puniew of
amenr1meut--a ''governmental
that the
was referred to the
its approval thereof.
is correct, the statute, section 65655,
a pnblie hearing. Plaintiffs' argument is
contelH1 that tlw sn bject of a juvenile hall
considered at the public lwaring held by the planning
and that the juvenile hall ordinance was a new
frerent one reqniriug a public hearing under the provisiolls of section 65657. [2] In support of their first argurdy upon aftida rits in vYhich it is ayerred that the
of a juvc!lile l11lll was not t1isc·nssed at the public hearc1
the planning eommission. 'rhe affidavits prorlefelldallt:.; are to tlw contr<U"Y. 'l'his vYas a question
det:ided adwrsely to plaintiffs by the trial court.
· '..c\n appellate eomt vvillnot disturb the implied findings
m;HJe by a i rial eourt in support of an order, any more
it 1rilt interfere 1rith express findings upon which a final
is pred il:at<•d. [ 4] \\'hen the evidence is conflict\rill be presmned that the eourt found en~ry faet necesro sup port its order that the eviderwe vrould justify.
far as it has pastied on the 1veight of the evidence, its
findings are eonclusiYe. This rule is equally applicable
vdH•tllt·r the lcYidence is oral or documentary." (irlurray v. Su44 Cal.2d GJI. 619 [284 P.2d 1] .) [6] "When
is triecl Oll affld;wits, the rule on appeal is that those
ailidnxits fayorillg the eontention of the prevailing party
ish not only the faets stated therein but also all facts
may be. inferred therefrom, and vrhen tl1ere
;bstamial umflid ill the facts statefl, the l1etermination
eontroverted facts by the trial court vvill not be
"
(llayutin v. Rudnick, 115 Oal.App.2d 138,
P.2d 707]; People Y. Western illeat Co., 13 Cal.
[110 P. 3:3R I; Jlase!li v. E. II. Appleby & Co., Inc.,
634 12.iG P.2c1 618] ; Jones v. Lindsey, 114
237 [230 P.2d L:i3]; SchTeibcr v. Hooker, 114
684 [261 P.2d 55]; Paulekas Y. Paulekas, 117
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0.2d

v. Joint
Executh·e Board
190
.)
[255 P.2d
[7] Plaintifrs' setoncl a1·gument that the
hall
ordinance
the board
a public hearing
before the planning commission is supported by a statement
in the case of Johnston v. Board
) , 31
CaL2d 66
P .2d
. There it vvas said
76) : "Before
any ordinanee is adopted, the loeal planning eommission must
hold public hearings at whieh interested parties may appear.
Planning Act, § 5.) A proposed plan is then submitted to the loeal legislative body, which also holds public
hearings. Any change in the proposed ordinance nwst be
submitted to the cornrnisM:on fm· additional 1Jttblic hearings.
(Ibid. §
" (Emphasis added.) The italicized sentence
in the quotation appears to be incorrect. Section 6 ( Stats.,
] 929, ch. 838, p. 1809) reads in pertinent part as follows:
"~o change or addition to said master plan, or any part of it
as adopted by the planning commission, shall be made by the
legislative body until the said proposed change or addition
shall have been referred to the planning commission for
report thereon and an attested copy of said report thereon
filed with the legislative body by the planning commission .
. . . "Section 6, Act 5211b (Deering's Gen. Laws, pp. 1773177 4) provides also "No change in or addition to the master
plan or any part thereof, as adopted by the planning commission, shall be made by the legislative body in adopting
the same until the said proposed change or addition shall have
been referred to the planning commission for a report thereon
and an attested copy of such report shall have been filed
·with the legislative body." The present section 65655, heretofore quoted in full, requires only that the proposed change
be referred to the planning commission for a report and that
such report be filed with the legislative body. The legislative
history of the present section (added by Stats. 1953, ch.
1355, § 2, based on former § 65334, as added by Stats. 1951, ch.
8~34, § 1, p. 687: Stats. 1947, ch. 807, § 72, p. 1920: Stats.
1929, ch. 838, § 6.6, as added by Stats. 1937, ch. 665, § 15,
p. 1825) shows that if the juvenile hall ordinance in question
is considered merely as a "change" in an ordinance recommended to the legislative body by the planning commission
rather than an entirely new subject matter proposed and
initiated by the legislative body (Gov. Code, §§ 65656, 65657)
at no time has the applicable statute required a further public
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commission after
by the
body of the proposed change in the recommended
--"~n•nnn to
planning commission. The crucial question
whether or not the juvenile hall ordinance is
><ui"ueLlllLll': new initiated by the legislative body, or whether
vu•:u•o"" in an amendment to an ordinance pro~;uau.uu.5 commiSSIOn. [8] Defendants' arguappears the more logical one: that the phrase used by
11~acnuLu 5 commission in the proposed ordinance that propin any residential zone may be nsed for ''governmental
any kind'' is broad enough to encompass use of the
for a juvenile hall and that the ordinance passed by
~;;Lcuuau'"' was merely a part of the whole, or an ordinance
of lesser scope than that which they might have enacted. It
therefore, that no further public hearing was required
held by the planning commission upon receipt of the
change in the amendment recommended by that
Anything to the contrary in Johnston v. Board of
31 Cal.2d 66 [187 P.2d 686], is hereby disalso rely on the case of Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal.2d
P.2d 225]. We were there concerned with a different
We said there, in speaking of the Planning and
n"''"""'""''<•fi11.n Act (2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 5211c), that
legislative body shall not change the plan without
""r'"""''n the proposed change to the planning commission for
72) and the planning commission must hold
hearings on such proposed changes ( § 74) '' (emphasis
; pp. 134, 135). Section 72 is the predecessor of the
under consideration, 65655, and has been heretofore
commented upon. Section 74 refers to a change or addition
master plan initiated by the legislative body. In the
under consideration, the change in the master plan
'"'J"""""u, by way of proposed amendments to the ordinance,
the planning commission, not with the legislative body.
in the proposed amendment was made by the
body. Tl1e case of Simpson v. Hite, supra, is thereinapplicable.
Plaintiffs contend that the urgency clause of the ordiin question was improperly enacted without statutory
nttlAvrt~r therefor. Plaintiffs
section 25123 of the GovCode which provides: ''Except as provided in
•n:n"'"".n 4, Chapter 2, of the Elections Code, no ordinance
by the Board shall take effect within less than thirty
'x"""'"a"'
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after its passage." Section 1631 of
forth the ordinances which
1·efers to initiative and referendum
here involved.
ordinances ... shall become
date of final passage."
The urgency
of
and
and
ho\YeYer, does not invalidate the bala11ee of
In People . Phillips, 76
521
the court said "Under the
rule if no 0mergency
existed or the urgency declaration were hn-alid that 1vould not
impair the validity of the remainder of the statute 1vhich
would take effect at the regnlar time
law.''
(See also Michelson v. City of
109
[159 P. 431]; In r·e Hoffman, 155 Cal.
120 [99 P. 517,
132 Am.St.Hep. 75] ; Morgan v. City of Long Beach, 57 CaL
App. 134, 139 l207 P. 53]; Klassen v.
110 CaLJ\pp.2d
539, 543 [243 P.2d 28].)
[10] There is HO merit to plaintiffs' contention that the
ordinance invotved here is special
favoring one
class. It is conceded by plaintiffs that the
could have
exempted itself from the provisions of its basic zoning ordinance {see Snnny Slope ·water Co. v. City of
1 Cal.
2d 87, 98 [33 P.2d 672]; Jardine v. City of
199
CaL 64, 76 [248 P. 225, 48 A.I1.R. 509]). Since it could
have exempted itself, there appears to be no souud reason
why it should be prohibited from amending its basic zoning
ordinanee to permit residential property to be used for governmental purposes if such uses arc deemed advisable and
benefieial to the general public welfare.
For the foregoing reasons we conelude that the ordinance
in question \Hls Yalidly enacted, ·with the exeeption of the
urgency chmse, and that the order of the trial court Yacating
the temporary restraining orde·r, denying a preliminary injunction and discharging an order to shoy,- cause must be
affirmed. Because of this conclusion \Ye find it unnecessary to
consider the argument of defendants that
were not
entitled to relief by way of injunction.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, ,T., 'J'rayuor, .J.,
and Me Comb, .J., concurred.

,J.,

